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There is only one single proof of love – to 
give without return or chance of recovery, 
and thus to be able to lose and, eventually, 
to be lost in love. But love itself is never 
lost, because it is accomplished in loss.1 
 
 
1. Marion’s Phenomenology of Givenness. The Central Categories of Analysis 
 
In the following remarks, I will introduce Jean-Luc Marion’s categories of his 
phenomenology of the given and of the erotic in the narrow context of one film, 
Paul Thomas Anderson’s Magnolia (1999). Apart from using Marion’s termi-
nology as a set of analytical categories, I will also apply his method of the so-
called ‘third’ phenomenological reduction, the reduction to givenness, to inquire 
into the central topic of this article – love at loss. 
In his influential study Etant donné [Being Given] (1997), the noted French 
philosopher and theologian Jean-Luc Marion proclaims givenness [donation] to 
be the third and ultimate phenomenological reduction, one that goes farther than 
objectness (Husserl) and Being (Heidegger) (see Marion, 2001: 39f.). ‘Being 
given’ is conceived of here as a primary phenomenological state endowed with 
absoluteness and universality. Marion’s project thus attempts to translate “phe-
nomenality into the terms of givenness […] [by] reducing the phenomenon to 
the given or giving a phenomenon reduced to givenness” (ibid.: 173).2 It goes 
                                                          
1
 Marion, 2007: 71. The original reads as follows: “Il ne se trouve qu’une seule preuve 
d’amour – donner sans retour, ni reprise, donc pouvoir y prendre et éventuellement se 
perdre. Mais l’amour lui-même ne se perd jamais, puisqu’il s’accomplit dans la perte 
même.” (Marion, 2003: 118) 
2
 The original reads as follows: “Traduire la phénoménalité en termes de donation, […] 
réduire la phénomène au donné, ou de se donner un phénomène réduit à la donation.” 
(Ibid.: 287) 
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without saying that the origin of Marion’s reflections on givenness lies in the 
German idiom Es gibt [there is; literally, ‘it gives’] that predisposes the 
metaphysical tradition, most prominently in Husserl and Heidegger, to consider 
the basic ontological question of being in its proximity to the proposition of 
‘being given’ (see Marion, 2011: 10f.). However, Marion’s endeavor seeks to 
overcome this inevitable linguistic determination (see Marion, 2001a: 61f.). 
The new maxim “[s]o much reduction, so much givenness” (ibid.: 3),3 pro-
moted by Marion as the first and the last principle of phenomenology (see  Mar-
ion, 2002a: 25f.), leads to two essential consequences in his radical revision of 
that branch of philosophy. First, by considering givenness as being more origi-
nal than phenomenality itself, Marion reworks phenomenology in such a way 
that even the keystone of phenomenology – the phenomenon, die Erscheinung, 
the manifestation – becomes dependent on, and subordinate to givenness. “What 
shows itself first gives itself” (Marion, 2001: 5)4 – this formula assumes that 
nothing precedes givenness, least of all manifestation. This assumption is radi-
calized in yet another step, for, according to Marion, not everything that gives 
itself shows itself: “all that which gives itself does not show itself necessarily – 
givenness is not always phenomenalized.” (Marion, 2002a: 30)5 Givenness 
therefore allows us to access the limits of the visible, or to put this differently, to 
approach those phenomena that reveal themselves as escaping both objectness 
and beingness, because nothing, as Marion argues, escapes givenness itself. 
Everything is given, even love, even death, even nothingness, for “givenness is 
not equivalent to intuition and does not necessarily require it” (Marion, 2001: 
55).6 
Marion’s phenomenology provides a categorical apparatus for approaching 
certain exceptional phenomena which lie beyond the purview of traditional 
metaphysics and phenomenology. In his view, traditional philosophy confines 
itself to the consideration of either ‘poor’ phenomena (in which intention gives 
more than intuition) or of ‘common’ phenomena (in which intention is equal to 
intuition). By contrast, the phenomenology of givenness strives to approach 
those phenomena that are characterized by an excess of intuition over significa-
tion, “where the duality between intention (signification) and intuition (fulfill-
ment) certainly remains […], but to the contrary of poor and common, intuition 
                                                          
3
 The original reads as follows: “[a]utant de réduction, autant de donation” (ibid.: 4). 
4
 The original reads als follows : “Ce qui se montre, d’abord se donne” (ibid: 8). Italics 
are in the original if not otherwise indicated. 
5
 The original reads as follows: “tout ce qui se donne ne se montre pas pour autant – la 
donation ne se phénoménalise pas toujours” (Marion, 2010: 38). 
6
 The original reads as follows: “la donation n’équivaut pas à
 
l’intuition et ne l’exige pas 
nécessairement” (Marion, 2013: 93). 
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gives (itself) in exceeding what the concept […] can foresee of it and show” 
(Marion, 2002a: 112).7 
Marion defines such phenomena as paradoxes or saturated phenomena,8 
since they demonstrate the inversion of intuition and intention by interrupting or 
blinding the intentional aim, and therefore surpass the Kantian categories of 
quantity, quality, relation, and modality (see further below). The recourse to 
Kant seems to be important insofar as Marion’s notion of paradox is in fact very 
close to the Kantian concept of the aesthetic and his analysis of the sublime – 
something that Marion recognizes himself (see Marion, 2001: 198). Paradoxes 
in this sense thus touch directly on the problem of visibility. In paradox “intui-
tion subverts, therefore precedes, every intention, which it exceeds and de-
centers” and the “visibility of the appearance thus arises against the flow of the 
intention” (Marion, 2001: 225).9 As a result, the given can no longer be consti-
tuted as a finite object inscribed within a delimited horizon. The surplus of intui-
tion prevents the given from becoming visible and thus expands the boundaries 
of the horizon: “Intuition is no longer exposed in the concept; it saturates it and 
renders it overexposed – invisible, unreadable not by lack, but indeed by an 
excess of light.” (Ibid.: 198)10 
This inversion of intention and intuition also appears to be decisive in  
Marion’s rethinking of the subject. This is the second consequence of his phe-
nomenological formula ‘so much reduction, so much givenness’. Here, Marion 
goes much further than simply criticizing or doubting the metaphysical ego 
cogitans or the intending I of classical phenomenology. Rather, he argues that 
the excess of intuition must withdraw primacy from the I and render the initia-
tive of appearing back to the phenomenon itself:  
                                                          
7
 The original reads as follows: “où certes demeure la dualité entre intention (significa-
tion) et intuition (remplissement) […], mais où, au contraire des phénomènes pauvres et 
communs, l’intuition (se) donne en excédant ce que le concept […] peut en prévoir et 
montrer” (Marion, 2010: 141). 
8
 Marion suggests four basic figures of excess: event [événement], idol [idole], flesh 
[chair] and icon [icône]. These four figures play a central part in Marion’s phenomeno-
logical apparatus (see Marion, 2001: 3f.) and are elaborated at greater length in his book 
De surcroît [In Excess] that appeared in 2001. 
9
 The original reads as follows: “l’intuition subvertit, donc précède toute intention 
qu’elle déborde et décentre: la visibilité de la parence surgit ainsi à contre-courant de 
l’intention” (Marion, 2013: 370). 
10
 The original reads as follows: “l’intuition ne s’expose plus dans le concept, elle sature 
et le rend surexposé – invisible, illisible non point par défault, mais bien par excès de 
lumière.” (Ibid.: 327) 
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[W]hat gives itself shows itself, always starting from the irreducible and prime 
self of the appearing. The I is made the clerk, the recipient, or the patient of 
this process, but almost never the author, or the producer. (Marion, 2002a: 
26)11 
One might say that the subject endures a phenomenological epoché – reduction 
to givenness – in order to be able not to think or intend, but to experience the 
surplus of intuition and lack of signification imposed on him or her by a satu-
rated phenomenon. Marion calls such an alternative, phenomenologically more 
intrinsic type of subjectivity the gifted [l’adonné]. The gifted no longer consti-
tutes phenomena, but receives the pure given and is received from it. This pecu-
liar formulation, a passive participle, derives from the French reflexive verb 
s’adonner [literally, ‘to give oneself over’], which conceals a paradoxical merg-
ing of activity and passivity, a subtle passage from one to another, and hence a 
crucial annulment of both categories.  
Marion develops a chain of synonyms nuancing l’adonné: “the one who 
receives itself from what it receives” (ibid.: 48)12 is the receiver [attributaire] 
(see Marion, 2001: 248; 2013: 405). In terms of metaphysical grammar, the 
gifted appears neither in the nominative that intends the object (as in Husserl), 
nor in the genitive of Being (as in Heidegger), nor in the accusative – accused 
by the Other (as in Levinas), but rather in a more original dative-ablative – the 
me [moi] (see Marion, 2001: 269). Another word Marion uses for the gifted is 
the witness [témoin] (Marion, 2013: 355), the one who “does not see the giv-
en in its totality (by excess of intuition)” (Marion, 2001: 217)13 and therefore 
is only capable of registering the given in a reduced fashion. The prism 
[prisme], the screen [écran], and the frame [cadre] refer to the ability of the 
gifted to reveal and phenomenalize the given akin to a projection surface (see 
Marion, 2002a: 50; 2010: 62). In his more recent book Le phénomène 
érotique [The Erotic Phenomenon] (2003) Marion develops his phenomenol-
ogy of givenness further and offers an even more unexpected alternative to 
the Cartesian subject. He now speaks of the ego amans, the lover [amant], 
instead of the ego cogitans, the thinker. Marion writes: 
                                                          
11
 The original reads as follows: “[C]e qui se montre se donne et ce qui se donne se 
montre toujours à partir du soi irréductible et premier de l’apparaître; de ce procès, le Je 
se fait le greffier, le destinataire ou le patient, mais presque jamais l’auteur ou le produc-
teur” (Marion, 2010: 31). 
12
 The original reads as follows: “celui qui se reçoit lui-même de ce qu’il reçoit” (ibid.: 
60). 
13
 The original reads as follows: “[l]e témoin […] ne voit pas en totalité le phénomène 
donné (par excès d’intuition)” (Marion, 2013: 356). 
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Man is revealed to himself by the originary and radical modality of the erotic. 
Man loves – which is what distinguishes him from all other finite beings […]. 
Man is defined neither by the logos, nor by the being within him, but by this 
fact that he loves (or hates), whether he wants to or not. (Marion, 2007: 7)14 
Descartes, according to Marion, made a mistake: his ego cogitans thinks, but it 
does not love. Whereas in Descartes love is excluded from the subject’s modali-
ties, Marion’s inquiry into the erotic proceeds from the fact that “I love even 
before being” (ibid.: 8)15 and that love determines the final and original ipseity 
of the subject. 
 
2. Love and Erotic Reduction 
 
In Marion’s third phenomenological reduction, love appears as a phenomenon 
defined in terms of intersubjectivity, saturation and givenness (see Marion, 
2002a: 37f.; Marion, 2002c: passim). Inquiring into the problem of intersub-
jectivity, Marion recurs initially to the traditional metaphysical approach of the 
self, which, he argues, remains by definition solipsistic and autonomous. In his 
view, metaphysics and phenomenology concentrated primarily on the subject’s 
most inner self and thus excluded the Other.  
 
2.1 Separation and Distance 
 
Indeed, one must admit that even one of the most profound thinkers of love, 
Emmanuel Levinas, to whom Marion deliberately refers and with whom he 
inevitably polemicizes – even Levinas did not overcome that very solipsism. 
Although Levinas subordinates the ipseity of the subject to the absolute alterity 
of the Other and defines existence as desire of the Other and “being for the  
Other” (see Levinas, 1979: 302),16 he nonetheless conceives of ipseity as the act 
of the subject’s individuation which he ultimately calls separation [séparation 
de moi]: 
                                                          
14
 The original reads as follows: “L’homme se révèle au contraire à lui-même par la 
modalité originaire et radicale de l’érotique. L’homme aime – ce qui le distinge 
d’ailleurs de tous les autres étants finis […]. L’homme ne se définit ni par le logos, ni 
par l’être en lui, mais par ceci qu’il aime (ou hait), qu’il le veuille ou non.” (Marion, 
2003: 18) 
15
 The original reads as follows: “j’aime avant même que d’être” (ibid.: 19). 
16
 The original reads as follows: “l’être pour autrui” (Levinas, 2009: 337). 
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Separation is the very act of individuation, the possibility in general for an en-
tity which is posited in being to be posited not by being defined by its refer-
ences to a whole, by its place within a system, but starting from itself. (ibid.: 
299f.)17  
The relationship with the Other does not nullify separation,18 for any kind of 
mutual integration would risk turning into totality, which Levinas wants to 
avoid. To Levinas’ separated being, the Other appears as a gaze in an always 
unequal face-to face communication. However, the Other cannot be given in 
intuition, he reaches me only through his rhetoric – by speaking to me, calling 
upon me or obeying me: “The distance is untraversable, and at the same time 
traversed” (ibid.: 62).19 In Levinas the access to the Other thus remains more or 
less closed; at least in terms of direct manifestation, the Other is at all times 
distanced from me.  
What follows from this autonomy or separation when love is in play?  
Marion argues that, if one follows Levinas, the separation would mean a kind of 
a gap within myself, within interiority, and hence the ego would inevitably end 
up loving him- or herself (see Marion, 2007: 41f.). Since in the field of the  
erotic the subject’s (or rather the lover’s) intention is directed to the Other, to 
exteriority, to transcendence, the “assurance [of love] can by definition only 
come upon me from an elsewhere that is definitely anterior, other, and foreign to 
me, an elsewhere that I lack and that defines me by this lack” (ibid.: 42).20 Mar-
ion thus reverses the Levinasian separation; the assurance of love would es-
trange me not from the Other but from myself: 
The very one who could assure me must estrange me […]. [A]ssurance sepa-
rates me from myself, because it opens within me the separation of an else-
where. (Ibid.: 41; the italics are mine)21 
                                                          
17
 The original reads as follows: “La séparation est l’acte même de l’individuation, la 
possibilité, d’une façon générale, pour une entité qui se pose dans l’être, de s’y poser 
non pas en se définissant par ses références à un tout, par sa place dans un système, 
mais à partir de soi.” (Ibid.: 334) 
18
 See ibid. 281: “Le rapport avec Autrui n’annule pas la séparation.” 
19
 The original reads as follows: “La distance est infranchissable et, à la fois, franchie” 
(ibid.: 56). 
20
 The original reads as follows: “cette assurance ne peut par définition m’advenir que 
d’un ailleurs définitivement antérieur, autre et étranger à moi, qui me manque et me 
définit par ce manque lui-même” (Marion, 2003: 72). 
21
 The original reads as follows: “Cela même qui pourrait m’assurer devrait m’aliéner 
[…]. [L]’assurance m’écarte de moi-même, parce qu’elle ouvre en moi l’écart d’un 
ailleurs.” (Ibid.: 72) 
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Marion’s word for this exteriority within me is the gap [l’écart] (ibid.: 41f.). It is 
grammatically expressed by the Other’s localization in the question posed by the 
lover: “Does anyone out there love me?” (Ibid.: 29)22 This gap, or distance, is a 
necessary precondition for entering into the erotic reduction. It makes me search 
for the assurance of love but does not end up with me loving myself for myself, 
for love of self is impossible for Marion.23 Exteriority as a gap, as a distance 
within me would lead me astray from myself, “into the insane illusion of imag-
ining myself as my own elsewhere” (ibid.: 47).24 It would force me to think 
myself as an Other. The distance Marion speaks about must therefore not be 
understood in terms of transcendence, as in Levinas, but in terms of immanence: 
Loving requires an exteriority that is not provisional but effective, an exterior-
ity that remains for long enough that one may cross it seriously. Loving re-
quires distance and the crossing of distance. Loving requires more than a 
feigned distance, or one that is not truly dug out or truly crossed. In the drama 
of love, actions must be accomplished effectively over distance – disturbing, 
going, coming, returning. (Ibid.: 46f.; the italics are mine)25 
 
2.2. Contingency and Contiguity: Overcoming Separation in Magnolia (1999) 
 
Crossing a distance in the most direct sense is a crucial moment in the process 
of phenomenological apparition which Marion describes using the figure of 
anamorphosis. Anamorphosis in Marion is nothing other than a specific “form 
of arrival” of the phenomenon (Marion, 2001: 124), which, in order to appear to 
the gaze of the viewer, passes from a vague form through de- and re-forming 
itself to the second form – the one that fixes a figure of apparition for it (see 
ibid.: 123f.). Thus, the given arises from “an invisible to a visible form accord-
                                                          
22
 The original reads as follows: “M’aime-t-on d’ailleurs?” (Ibid.: 51) 
23
 See Marion, 2007: 44: “[L]ove of self can indeed be proclaimed, but it cannot be per-
formed.” The original reads as follows: “[L]’amour de soi peut bien se proclamer, mais 
il ne peut pas se performer.” (Marion, 2003: 76) 
24
 The original reads as follows: “dans l’illusion démente de m’imaginer mon proper 
ailleurs” (ibid.: 80). 
25
 The original reads as follows: “Or aimer exige une extériorité non pas provisoire, 
mais effective, qui demeure assez pour qu’on puisse la franchir sérieusement. Aimer 
demande la distance et le parcours de la distance. Aimer demande plus qu’une dis-
tance feinte, ni vraiment creusée, ni vraiment franchie. Dans la dramatique de 
l’amour, les actions doivent s’accomplir effectivement au long de la distance – dépar-
tir, aller, venir, revenir.” (Ibid.: 79) 
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ing to a precise axis of visibility” (ibid.: 173).26 Rising into appearing, the phe-
nomenon “must cross a distance (an ‘elsewhere’) that separates it and therefore 
must (sur-)render itself there” (ibid.: 123).27 This crossing of distance and the 
eventual arrival at the gifted ultimately defines the specific contingency of the 
given phenomenon.  
Marion’s concept of phenomenological contingency differs from the con-
cept of traditional metaphysics in the sense that it is not grounded in the modali-
ties of necessity and causality. This “more original contingency”, or a “new, 
phenomenologically superior contingency” (ibid.: 132; 138), refers foremost to 
the manifestation of the phenomenon to the receiver. In other words, it embraces 
the formal showing of its intrinsic givenness, or the ‘arrival’ of the phenome-
non: 
[U]nderstanding contingency by simple opposition to necessity is […] errone-
ous because it hides its essential phenomenological character – that the phe-
nomenon arises and touches me (contingit). (Ibid.: 132)28 
This particular contingency should be understood here in the literal, nearly tac-
tile sense of its Latin origin, contingere [to happen, to touch], as well as of the 
German word for contingency, Zufall [chance, coincidence]: “[C]ontingent says 
what touches me, what reaches me and therefore arrives to me (according to the 
Latin) or (according to the German) what ‘falls like that’, therefore ‘falls upon 
me from above’” (ibid.: 125).29 For Marion, contingency, taken in its original, 
propositional meaning, refers to the contact between the given and the gifted, 
and thus to the gradual, anamorphotic overcoming of the distance between them 
by aligning the recipient with the acceptance of the given, or, in short, by form-
ing a contiguity.   
In the erotic reduction, the Other must therefore cross a distance in order to 
appear to me (anamorphotically), to contact me (determined by the original 
phenomenological contingency), and I, as its receiver, must put myself “at the 
precise point on the line where the coming forward imposes itself”, that is, “one 
                                                          
26
 The original reads as follows: “d’une forme invisible à une forme visible selon un axe 
précis de visibilité” (Marion, 2013: 287). 
27
 The original reads as follows: “[L]e phénomène […] pour monter au paraître, il doive 
traverser une distance (un ‘ailleurs’) qui l’en sépare et donc s’y rendre” (ibid.: 203). 
28
 The original reads as follows: “Erronée, la compréhension de la contingence par 
simple opposition à la nécessité […], parce qu’elle en masque le caractère phénoméno-
logique essentiel – que le phénomène surgisse et me touche (contigit)” (ibid.: 217). 
29
 The original reads as follows: “[L]e contingent dit ce qui me touche, ce qui m’attent et 
donc ainsi m’arrive (suivant le latin), ou (suivant l’allemand) ce qui ‘tombe comme ça’, 
donc ‘me tombe dessus’” (ibid.: 206f.). 
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must expose oneself to the phenomenon to receive its form – as one receives a 
blow, a shock, or an emotion” (ibid.: 173),30 and achieve in this way the status 
of the gifted.  
 
The narrative structure of Paul Thomas Anderson’s film Magnolia links indi-
vidual stories of at least nine characters and can be defined, using Maggie 
Dunn’s term, as a composite film (see Dunn/Morris, 1995). In Magnolia, there 
is a certain parallel disconnectedness which determines both the intra-diegetic 
and extra-diegetic levels. At the beginning, the viewer is not aware whether all 
the storylines are interlinked or not. The discontinuous storytelling, or lack of 
narrative connection (extra-diegetic), mirrors the more fundamental disconnect-
edness of the characters towards each other (intra-diegetic). The latter can be 
understood psychologically, namely as solitude or lack of communication, but 
foremost phenomenologically – as an original state of being detached from the 
Other. One might call this being separated, or distanced; in any case, the access 
to the Other is definitively blocked or hindered. Some striking examples in the 
movie are the disturbed or even ruptured parent-child relationships between Earl 
Partridge and his son Frank Mackey, between Claudia and her father Jimmy 
Gator, and between Rick and his son, the wunderkind Stanley Spector. There is 
also the unaccomplished amorous relationship between Donnie and the bar-
tender Brad, as well as between the policeman Jim and his yet unknown lover. 
Jim is even introduced as someone who is looking for a relationship with the 
help of an anonymous phone service: “I’m really interested in meeting someone 
special who likes quiet things. My life is very stressful and I’d hope to have a 
relationship that is very calm and undemanding and loving” (movie quote). 
Yet the course of the story development allows the viewer to experience a 
kind of consolidation of the narrative; all the storylines and film characters turn 
out to be connected with one other, albeit in different ways. They are formally 
unified through the TV-Quiz What Kids Know: some characters are the show’s 
participants, some work for it, the others watch the show on TV. There is also a 
temporal and spatial unity: the movie depicts one and the same day in one place 
– Magnolia Boulevard, Los Angeles. Finally, there are all kinds of interpersonal 
ties between the characters (relatives, friends, co-workers etc.) that become 
disclosed as the story progresses. Thus, the net of interconnections reveals itself 
to the viewer according to its anamorphosis, that is to say, it aligns the viewer to 
a precise phenomenological point and arises to its final visibility (it is perhaps 
                                                          
30
 The original reads as follows: “au point précis de la ligne où l’advenue s’impose: il 
faut s’exposer au phénomène pour en recevoir la forme – comme on reçoit un coup, un 
choc, une émotion.” (Ibid.: 287). 
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no accident that there are so many alignment shots in Magnolia). Step by step, 
the viewer attains a certain holistic perspective that enables him or her to expe-
rience a multiple identification with all the characters at the same time. In the 
end, total disconnectedness proves to be the opposite: a total connectedness 
which also encompasses the film’s prologue and epilogue, namely the three 
framing stories told by the narrator. Although not linked to the main narrative, 
these stories question the very possibility of unbelievable coincidences: “This is 
not just a matter of chance […]. These strange things happen all the time.” 
(movie quote) 
 
2.3 Envisaging the Other: Alterity as Icon and Call 
 
In Magnolia, the overcoming of the initial disconnectedness described above 
causes the plot of the movie to unfold. According to Marion, the access to the 
Other becomes most direct when the gifted envisages the Other, engages in a 
face-to-face contact with it, when the gazes of the receiver and the giver cross 
within the so-called erotic reduction. The special status of the face,31 the experi-
ence of exchanged gazes and counter-intentionality were already essential for 
Levinas in his analysis of the Other’s epiphany to the separated me. But what is 
the specific nature of the face’s appearance in the field of love?  
While consciously following Levinas’ logic, at a certain point Marion casts 
doubt on the assumption that the face necessarily belongs to the field of ethics 
and transcendence (see Marion, 2002b: 81). The Levinasian silent ethical com-
mand in which the Other is manifested – “Thou shalt not kill!” (Marion 2007: 
125)32 – implies a universality and establishes the Other in an absolute tran-
scendence beyond phenomenality. Marion’s primary concern, on the contrary, is 
the possibility “to enter into contact with the other, or rather to allow him to 
enter into contact with me […] to feel myself touched by his gaze” (ibid.: 63).33 
 
                                                          
31
 The face [visage] is not to be confused with the facet [face]; the latter is only a surface 
and an object allowing no access to the Other, whereas the face opens up a depth; it 
addresses me with a gaze, envisages me and allows a direct access to the Other in person 
(see Marion, 2007: 167; Marion, 2003: 258). 
32
 The original reads as follows: “Tu ne tueras pas!” (Marion, 2003: 198) In Levinas we 
read: “Tu ne commetras pas de meurtre” (Levinas, 2009: 217). 
33
 The original reads as follows: “d’entrer en contact avec autrui, ou plutôt de le laisser 
entrer en contact avec moi […], me sentir touché par le sien [son regard]” (Marion, 
2003: 104). 
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As in Levinas, Marion’s Other reveals itself as a face, but – unlike Levinas 
– he conceives this revelation in the most direct, palpable, tangible and contigu-
ous way: “I no longer dream of elsewhere, I no longer argue about it – I experi-
ence it.” (Ibid.)34 The face descends from transcendence (‘an elsewhere’) to its 
immanence (‘here’) and is experienced as a singular, individualized face – the 
face of the beloved one that is just like me, the lover, irreplaceable: “I is not just 
anybody”, or in French “[j]e n’est pas le premier venu”, literally, ‘the first to 
arrive’ (Marion, 2002b: 83).  Within the erotic reduction, the Other is devoid of 
any universality, and therefore can no longer say to me: “Thou shalt not kill!” 
above all because 
she and I have left the universal, even the ethical universal, in order to strive 
toward particularity – mine and hers, because it is a question of me and of 
you, and surely not of a universally obligating neighbor. […] [E]ach only aims 
at being individualized in individualizing the other, thus exactly piercing and 
transgressing the universal. (Marion, 2007: 126)35 
The manifestation of the Other’s face, or, as Marion calls it, counter-envisaging, 
becomes thus possible and even necessary. It occurs in the figure of the icon. 
Marion develops his notion of icon within his phenomenology of saturated or 
paradoxical phenomena (see above). As a saturated phenomenon, the icon is 
characterized by an excess of intuition in relation to signification. Nonetheless, 
in Marion the problem of visibility remains as ambiguous as in Levinas. In spite 
of the superabundance of the intuitively given, the epiphany of the face is irre-
ducible to usual, physical vision. Visibility must be understood here in terms of 
eluding phenomenological intentionality. What do we see when we look into the 
Other’s face, inquires Marion, and more precisely, what do we see when we 
look into the very center of the face, the midst of the visible – the eyes? No-
thing. We see the black pupils of the eyes. We look at the sole place where pre-
cisely nothing can be seen (see Marion, 2002a: 115). Marion speaks about the 
gaze being invasible [sic],36 implying the fundamental inability to see what 
gives itself as object in accordance with one’s own intentionality.  
                                                          
34
 The original  reads as follows: “L’ailleurs, désormais, je ne le rêve plus, je ne le 
discute plus – je l’éprouve.” (Ibid.) 
35
 The original reads as follows: “[L]ui et moi avons quitté l’universel, même 
l’universel éthique, pour nous efforcer à la particularité – la mienne et la sienne, 
puisqu’il s’agit de moi et de toi et sûrement pas d’un prochain universellement obligeant 
[…]. [C]hacun ne vise qu’à s’individualiser en individualisant autrui, donc transperce et 
transgresse précisément l’universel.” (Ibid.: 198) 
36
 Literally, ‘invisible and untargetable’: see the French viser [to target, to aim at] (see 
Marion, 2002b: 81). 
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We may recall that Marion’s goal is to demonstrate how saturated phenom-
ena overcome the four Kantian categories. (i) With respect to quantity, a para-
dox or saturated phenomenon remains invisable, which means that, being given 
in extensive magnitude, “it could not be measured in terms of its parts” (Marion, 
2001: 200).37  (ii) The category of quality is exceeded in the way that the gaze 
reaches its tolerable maximum and cannot sustain the excess of intuition or of 
the visible that becomes unbearable [unsupportable] for the eye (see ibid.: 
202f.). (iii) Being absolute [absolu] with respect to relation, a saturated phe-
nomenon attains and blurs, if not exceeds, the limits of the horizon. This way, it 
evades any analogy of experience (see ibid.: 206f.). (iv) Finally, the Kantian 
modality is undermined in Marion in the sense that the crucial epistemological 
dependence of the phenomenon of the (re)constructing power of the transcen-
dental I is broken here for once and for all. This dependence would mean that 
the phenomena which cannot be thought and do not have the preconditions to be 
experienced by the ego do not appear at all, and consequently do not have the 
status of a phenomenon. In Marion, saturated phenomena, on the contrary, do 
not ‘agree with’ the subjective condition for their experience, and render them-
selves irregardable [irregardable] (see ibid.: 212f.). This becomes even clearer in 
the opposition ‘to see/to look at’ [voir/regarder], to which Marion resorts quite 
often in his explanations. It is the literal meaning of the French word regarder 
that makes this experience of invisibility more comprehensible: re-garder [to 
guard, to keep an eye on]. Like gazing, regarder 
is about being able to keep the visible thus seen under the control of the seer 
[…]. To gaze at the [saturated] phenomenon is therefore equivalent not to see-
ing it, but indeed to transforming it into an object visible according to an al-
ways poor or common phenomenality. (Ibid.: 214)38 
A face as icon requires an endless hermeneutics; its signification always remains 
incomplete. In particular, the gaze of the beloved one is experienced as an ex-
cess of signification, since neither a particular meaning nor the sum of all mean-
ings can be assigned to it. Within the erotic reduction, when every act of inten-
tionality is blocked, the ego is rendered stunned and bedazzled by the Other’s 
gaze, it becomes ‘reduced’ to the state of what can hardly be called a conscious-
                                                          
37
 The original reads as follows: “[i]l ne saurait se mesurer à partir de ses parties”  
(Marion, 2013: 330). 
38
 The original reads as follows: “il s’agit de pouvoir garder le visible ainsi vu sous le 
contrôle du voyant […]. Regarder le phénomène n’équivaut donc pas à le voir, mais 
bien à le transformer en un objet visible suivant une phénoménalité toujours pauvre ou 
commune” (ibid.: 352). 
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ness anymore. It is rather a mere pre-reflective receptivity, that is, however, 
open to givenness or that gives itself to the given, to the lover, to the be-loved.  
A notable example of this experience of invisibility and of bedazzlement in 
Magnolia is the first encounter between the policeman Jim Kurring and Claudia. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Encounter between Claudia and Jim 
 
Jim enters Claudia’s house as a representative of the authority to control and 
probably punish her, but he leaves as a lover. Their meeting is staged as a  
counter-gaze: two faces freeze in astonishment. Phenomenologically, strangers 
immediately become lovers as soon as they engage themselves in the infinite 
hermeneutics of the face. In this scene, Marion’s concept of the face is inter-
twined with the notion of another saturated phenomenon, the flesh, that sets off 
– metaphorically speaking – a farther aspect of this encounter. Claudia opens the 
door and invites Jim in. The feeling of the Other’s flesh succeeds “where I feel 
that something puts up no resistance to me, and that […] this something with-
draws, effaces itself and makes room for me, in short that this something opens 
itself” (Marion, 2007: 118).39 Claudia puts up no resistance to Jim, in contrast to 
the previous visitor – her father Jimmy Gator – who is let in by someone else 
and is thrown out with revulsion by Claudia herself. This parallel is not acci-
dental: both Jim and Jimmy (the choice of names is apparently not a coincidence 
either) have an erotic connection to Claudia. We learn later that Claudia used to 
be molested by her father, so that her refusal to welcome him in her house is the 
only adequate response to his abuse of love. It might be worth mentioning that 
the scene of the amorous encounter between Claudia and Jim echoes Levinas’ 
                                                          
39
 The original reads as follows: “où je sens que cela ne me résiste pas et que […] cela 
se retire, s’efface et me fait place, bref que cela  s’ouvre” (Marion, 2003: 186f.). 
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spatial metaphoric that pervades his discussion of interiority (see Levinas, 1979: 
154). Levinas compares interiority to a house and the subject to a host whose 
relation to the Other is performed as a “welcome of the face” (see ibid.: 299).40 
 
In spite of the longing for the Other, love in Levinas, Marion argues, leads back 
to the (separated) me and thus turns into “an optical illusion of my conscious-
ness, which experiences only itself alone” (Marion, 2002b: 75). The Other re-
mains autonomous, and so do I. This “amorous autism” (ibid.) – the main point 
of Marion’s criticism – derives from that very solipsism which Levinas cannot 
and does not wish to elude. This is also the pattern according to which the love 
story between Jim and Claudia seems to develop. This is why it first fails. When 
asking Jim for absolute sincerity, Claudia herself, however, avoids talking about 
the most important thing – her childhood trauma, which, as banal as it may 
sound, is the key to all her failed relationships. Claudia persists in staying sepa-
rated or disconnected from her beloved one – a perfect example of love after 
Levinas.  
The final change occurs at the very end of the film: The last shot is a close-
up of Claudia’s shining face smiling slightly at Jim without saying anything 
(Fig. 2).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Claudia (the final shot) 
 
Again, this is another matching shot with the scene with Claudia and her father 
Jimmy from the beginning of the movie, in which Claudia turns to her father 
with a grimace of disgust and revulsion. In both scenes all we are offered is her 
                                                          
40
 The original reads as follows: “L’interiorité, accomplit concrètement par la maison” 
(Levinas, 2009: 164), and further: “Le sujet est un hôte”, “accueil du visage” (ibid.: 
334). 
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face, an icon, which never runs out of meanings and exceeds all of them. The 
viewer is not given a clue about what Claudia might think or decide, alone be-
cause he is just also involved in the continuous and never-ending interpretation 
of the face. The only thing we can suppose is that Claudia opens herself, or 
better, gives herself to love, and nothing can make this passivity in the very core 
of activity more explicit than her silent face.  
It is apparently not just a coincidence that both the introductory and final 
shots in Magnolia depict two icons, two faces: Frank’s and Claudia’s, who are 
both children abused by their fathers. Frank’s provocative call in a TV commer-
cial41 and Claudia’s silent face looking directly into the camera perform the 
same figure of saturation – the icon imposing a call (Figs. 2 and 3). For Marion, 
as well as for Levinas, the face remains invisible and can therefore appear para-
doxically “under the form, not of an object spectacle, but of a call […]. [I]ts 
phenomenality is accomplished when it is made heard [understood]” (Marion, 
2002a: 118f.; the italics are mine).42 What does the face say within erotic reduc-
tion? Marion suggests: “For in the erotic reduction, the face no longer com-
mands me only with ‘Thou shalt not kill!’ but demands ‘Thou shalt love me!’ or 
more modestly, ‘Love me!’” (Marion, 2007: 167).43 
 
 
Fig. 3. Frank Mackey’s show on TV 
                                                          
41
 Frank addresses himself to the TV-viewers with a promise: “Seduce and Destroy 
[Frank’s show] creates an immediate sexual attraction in any muffin you meet” (movie 
quote). 
42
 The original reads as follows: “sous la figure non d’un spectacle d’objet, mais d’un 
appel” (Marion, 2010: 149). 
43
 The original reads as follows: “Car, en réduction érotique, le visage ne me commande 
plus seulement ‘Tu ne tueras point!’ [sic], mais demande ‘Tu m’aimeras!’, ou plus 
modestement ‘Aime-moi!’” (Marion, 2003: 259) 
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One of Marion’s major assumptions is that love is conceived in a ‘univocal’ 
way, i.e. that the erotic embraces all its manifestations such as, for example, 
eros and agape as well as sexual and filial affection:  
A serious concept of love distinguishes itself by its unity, or rather by its pow-
er to keep together significations that nonerotic thought cuts apart […]. Uni-
vocal, love is only told in one way. (Ibid.: 5)44  
Accordingly, when speaking about the erotic reduction and the erotic call in 
Magnolia, we must think of all kinds of love and (loving) relationships with the 
Other, as long as his or her call summons me (in the dative) and defines me as 
the gifted, as the lover or as the beloved. In the film, this is staged quite literally: 
Jim is called to Claudia (an emergency call); Frank is called (on the phone, 
passing through a chain of mediators) to his dying father Earl by the male nurse 
Phil Parma. This also occurs indirectly in one of the final sequences of the  
movie, in which the little prodigy Stanley begs his father Rick: “Dad, you have 
to be nicer to me!” (movie quote) – an appeal that can be reformulated as or 
rather reduced to the desperate request ‘Love me!’ 
A call in a purely phenomenological sense manifests itself in the declara-
tion of love made by the homosexual Donnie. The figure of the beloved, the 
bartender Brad, is of minor importance here, since what Donnie experiences is 
above all an excess of love in himself: “My name is Donnie Smith and I have 
lots of love to give!” (movie quote) In other words, in the erotic reduction he 
finds himself as a giver whose gift of love must be given. In Marion’s terms, it 
is the ‘givability’ [donabilité] of the gift that – on the basis of itself – practically 
forces the giver to give it (see Marion, 2004: 31). Donnie does not know where 
to direct his flow of love: “I really have love to give. I just don’t know where to 
put it” (movie quote). Nonetheless, the temporary absence of the givee does not 
hinder the phenomenon of love to ‘show itself’, but on the contrary, determines 
its excess. In the figure of loving an absentee, the principle ‘so much reduction, 
so much givenness’ is radicalized once again. The lover transgresses reciprocity 
(which is one of the important qualities of a genuine erotic reduction), and 
thereby “contradicts economy’s sufficient reason” (Marion, 2007: 79).45 By 
loving without sufficient reason, the lover, having already acquired his erotic 
                                                          
44
 The original reads as follows: “Un concept sérieux de l’amour se signale en principe 
par son unité, ou plutôt par sa puissance à maintenir ensemble des significations que la 
pensée non érotique découpe […]. Univoque l’amour ne se dit qu’en un sens unique.” 
(Ibid.: 14f.) 
45
 The original reads as follows: “il [l’amant] contredit surtout la raison suffisante de 
l’économie” (ibid.: 129). 
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status, can love without seeing or even knowing the Other: “I do not love be-
cause I know what I see, but inversely I see and I know in the measure that I, the 
first to love, love.” (Ibid.: 79f.)46 
The lover makes the beloved first appear lovable and only then visible 
within the erotic reduction. In other words, the lover fulfills the anamorphosis, 
he phenomenalizes the beloved: “I am the first to put it on stage, by loving her. 
The lover makes appear the one whom she loves, not the reverse.” (Ibid.: 80; the 
italics are mine)47  
In the movie, the appearance of the lover is accomplished both visually and 
rhetorically. In the bar scene, in which Donnie encounters Brad, the camera 
reproduces Donnie’s point-of-view and moves in an arc across other faces to fix 
his gaze on one in particular – Brad’s. More precisely, his gaze focuses on 
Brad’s braces, which ultimately become Donnie’s love-fetish and make him 
carry out an unreasonable act of mimesis by opting for oral surgery (he becomes 
obsessed with the idea to get braces, too). In other words, Donnie ‘fixes’ his 
lover by staring at him; he puts Brad as a lover on stage (Figs. 4 and 5).  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Donnie looking at Brad 
 
                                                          
46
 The original reads as follows: “je n’aime donc pas parce que je connais ce que je vois, 
mais inversement je vois et je connais à la mesure où j’aime, moi le premier” (ibid.: 
130). 
47
 The original reads as follows: “je le mets le premier en scène en l’aimant. L’amant fait 
apparaître celui ou celle qu’il aime, non l’inverse.” (Ibid.: 130) 
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Fig. 5. Bartender Brad 
 
Here, the motif of the braces is connected with searching for an adequate way of 
speaking to the beloved one. Rhetorically, the lover’s phenomenalization is 
accomplished in Donnie’s emotional outburst and in his confused declaration of 
love: “I love you. I love you and I’m sick. I’ll talk to you, I’ll talk to you tomor-
row. I’m getting corrective oral surgery tomorrow. For my teeth. For my teeth 
and for you. For you so we can speak. You have braces. Me too. Me too. I’m 
getting braces, too. For you. For you, dear Brad. I love you, Brad. Brad the 
Bartender.” (movie quote)  
The lover declares his love as one declares war – without any reason (see 
Marion, 2007: 79). In this outbreak of love there is no signification, but only an 
act in which the me ‘fixes’ the Other in a real ‘here’, pointing him out quite 
literally, even theatrically: by putting the lover on stage. The statement of love 
becomes simply a deictic sign (see ibid.: 107). Phenomenologically speaking, 
Donnie individualizes the lover, gives him the status of such. By attracting 
Brad’s gaze upon himself and inviting him to render the gaze back, he demon-
strates that this particular person does not have the rank of an object or of a 
body, that he is not just any body.48 Even in his desperate demand “You wanna 
love me back? Love me back and I’ll be good to you. I’ll be goddamn good for 
you!” (movie quote) – there is no expectation of reciprocity, since he will be 
obviously rejected, but rather an acceptance of his own desire of the Other, an 
erotic injunction ‘Here I am!’ and his willingness to love: “[A] love scorned 
remains a love perfectly accomplished, just as a gift refused remains a perfectly 
                                                          
48
 See Marion, 2007:  86: “[T]he lover does not ask for reciprocity or anticipate it, but 
simply postulates that this other does not have the rank of an object.” The original reads 
as follows: “[L]’amant ne demande pas ici la réciprocité ni ne l’anticipe, mais postule 
seulement que cet autrui n’a pas rang d’objet” (Marion, 2003: 139). 
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given gift.” (Ibid.: 71)49 Thus, Donnie’s question – “Do you want to love me 
back?” (movie quote) – is possible only because he has already stepped into the 
erotic reduction, and loves first. This also designates his ultimate ipseity, name-
ly as ego amans. A love declaration establishes the radical individuation of the 
one who utters it: 
[I]n moving from the question “Does anyone out there love me?” to the ques-
tion “Can I love first?” I do indeed receive an assurance – the assurance that I 
love decidedly, that I love as a decided lover. This assurance […] above all 
[…] leads me back to myself, in my final ipseity […]. I become myself defi-
nitely each time and for as long as I, as lover, can love first. (Ibid.: 75f.)50 
 
3. Radicalized Erotic Reduction: Love and Death 
 
As we have seen, the lack of reciprocity does not make experience of love in-
complete, but, on the contrary, proves love as such. Whereas the Cartesian sub-
ject expects from love only “a more or less honest exchange, a negotiated reci-
procity, an acceptable compromise” (Marion, 2007: 69),51 the lover, on the con-
trary, “appears [only] when one of the actors in the exchange […] loves without 
requiring to be loved, and thus, in the figure of the gift, abolishes economy” 
(ibid.: 78).52 Marion insists that it is necessary to reject reciprocity in love, not 
because it seems improper, but because in love reciprocity becomes impossible: 
Reciprocity has nothing to do with love and befits only the economy and calcu-
lation of exchange (see ibid.: 69). Marion thereby applies his reductive method 
– the logic of givenness – in the field of the erotic.  
 
 
                                                          
49
 The original reads as follows: “[U]n amour méprisé reste un amour parfaitement 
accompli, comme un don refusé reste un don parfaitement donné” (ibid.: 117). 
50
 The original reads as follows: “[E]n passant de la question ‘m’aime-t-on d’ailleurs?’ à 
la question ‘puis-je aimer, moi le premier?’, je reçois donc bien une assurance – celle 
que j’aime décidément, que j’aime en amant décidé. Cette assurance […] me reconduit 
à moi-même, dans ma dernière ipséité […]. [J]e deviens définitivement moi-même à 
chaque fois et aussi longtemps que, comme amant, je peux aimer le premier.” (Ibid.: 
123f.) 
51
 The original reads as follows: “L’ego […] n’attend de l’amour qu’un échange à peu 
près honnête, une réciprocité négociée, un compromise acceptable.” (Ibid.: 113f.) 
52
 The original reads as follows: “L’amant apparaît, lorsque l’un des acteurs de 
l’échange […] aime sans exiger de l’être et abolit ainsi l’économie dans la figure du 
don.” (Ibid.: 128) 
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3.1 Transgressing Reciprocity and Figures of Lack in Love 
 
A radical abolishment of reciprocity proves to be a distinguishing feature of 
many ‘erotic’ relations in Magnolia. Reciprocity becomes irrevocably annulled 
when the characters are faced with a death experience. In the movie there are 
two deaths that mirror one another. Both Earl Partridge and Jimmy Gator have 
terminal cancer. Both of them have abused their children: Earl by leaving his 
son Frank with his dying mother, and Jimmy by sexually molesting his daughter 
Claudia. Both Earl and Jimmy make admissions of their infidelity, and both die 
at the end of the movie. In the following I will focus on the death of Earl  
Partridge, and more specifically on the way in which this death accomplishes 
the erotic reduction. Earl Partridge is related to three other characters in the film: 
his wife Linda, his son Frank Mackey and his male nurse Phil Parma. Earl is 
connected to them either by family bonds or/and by the sheer phenomenological 
fact of being envisaged by them.53  
Let us first concentrate on the erotic relation between Earl and his much 
younger wife Linda. Linda experiences a somehow paradoxical love: It is only 
when Earl is declared terminally ill that she discovers her love for him. The 
inability to find an adequate way to communicate love, which marks the other 
amorous relations in Magnolia as well, is sharpened here in the sense that even 
any verbal contact between Linda and Earl is one-sided – Earl remains for the 
most part unconscious and can barely recognize his wife (Fig. 6). Feeling over-
whelmed and desperate, Linda confesses to the family lawyer:  
I don’t want him to die, I didn’t love him when we met, and I’ve done so 
many bad things to him that he doesn’t know, things I want to confess to him, 
but now I do: I love him. I love him so much and I can’t stand his going. 
(movie quote)  
Linda decides to refuse Earl’s large inheritance, to which she is the only legal 
heir, and begs the lawyer to change Earl’s will. In Marion’s terms, Linda per-
forms an act of revoking economy and exchange, thereby confirming the abso-
lute impossibility of reciprocity in love. She experiences that “obsessional 
givenness” (Marion, 2001: 312)54 that expresses itself in her emotional break-
downs – “I feel so over the top with everything!” (movie quote) – and ends in 
her attempted suicide, which is, in fact, the utmost proof of her determination to 
leave the field of economy and reciprocity. 
 
                                                          
53
 I am omitting an analysis of the connection between Earl and Phil in order to elaborate 
more on the other two relations. 
54
 The original reads as follows: “donation obsessionnelle” (Marion, 2013: 507). 
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Fig. 6. Linda and Earl 
 
Linda’s love is a perfect illustration of what Marion in Etant donné calls the 
paradoxical case of “a givenness by denegation” (ibid.: 54).55 He discusses dif-
ferent figures of lack as nothing(ness), possibility, obscurity, void, and finally 
death, in other words, figures of ‘nongiven’, and inscribes them into the very 
horizon of givenness (see Marion, 2001: 53f.).56  
In Le phénomène érotique the nongiven is practically substituted by figures 
of lack, such as love for the absentee, love by loss, etc. Proceeding from the 
premise that the lover loves first and that only by doing so can make the beloved 
one appear, Marion draws a further deduction regarding the lover’s “incompara-
ble privilege”57 to love without even seeing, in other words, to love an absentee: 
the one being absent in space or in time, the one yet unknown or gone, living or 
dead (see Marion, 2007: 87f.). A love for a dying man fits well in with this in-
verted phenomenology of givenness and the erotic: “In loving the absentee, the 
lover in no way succumbs to delirium but instead limits herself to accomplish-
ing exactly the radicalized erotic reduction […].” (Ibid.: 88)58 The intuitive 
deficiency that death brings with it makes the ‘object’ of desire even more de-
sirable and ‘given’ – the primacy of givenness towards being cannot be exem-
plified any better than by this: 
                                                          
55
 The original reads as follows: “une donation par dénégation” (ibid.: 91). 
56
 The original terminology reads as follows: “le non-donné”, “le rien” or “le néant”, “la 
possibilité”, “l’obscurité”, “le vide”, “la mort” (ibid.). 
57
 The original  reads  as follows:  “un privilège incomparable” (Marion, 2003: 141). 
58
 The original reads as follows: “En aimant l’absent, l’amant ne cède à aucun délire, il se 
borne à exactement accomplir la réduction érotique radicalisée […]” (ibid.: 141f.). 
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The lacking remains simply absent for everybody, but for the one who desires 
it, its intuitive absence still gives it, indeed more intensely. What is lacking 
shines by its absence – the latter, without intuition, gives itself all the more. 
(Marion, 2001: 312)59 
By dying, and thus by abandoning the very horizon of phenomenality, Earl 
fulfills the function of a so-called bracketed givee. For Linda, however, who is 
the giver of love, the ego amans, this changes little. On the contrary, it makes 
her a lover par excellence since the abandoned remains nonetheless the gifted, 
the adonné.60 Loss suspends reciprocity in the most radical manner. Marion’s 
formula ‘so much reduction, so much givenness’ proves to be absolutely deci-
sive here and can also be reformulated as “the more I love at a loss, the more I 
simply love” (Marion, 2007: 71).61  
As Marion maintains, in loving the absentee or loving at a loss, love finds 
its highest accomplishment, since the erotic reduction is realized in its full po-
tential. Love at a loss also attests the precedence of love over nothing and death, 
just as it confirms once again the primacy of the phenomenological status of 
loving over being: “Loving surpasses being with an excess […]. To love without 
being loved – this defines love without being.” (Ibid.: 71f.)62 
 
3.2. Love Is to See the Other Die 
 
From Earl’s deathbed confession to his male nurse Phil we learn that the actual 
story of his loss began long ago, when he left his wife dying of cancer and their 
then underage son. His son, who could not forgive Earl this betrayal, decided to 
change his name, the father’s name, thereby also expressing this break symboli-
cally. Earl’s son turns into a cynical misogynist, the sex guru Frank Mackey, 
author of the self-help seminar Seduce and Destroy. In a caricatured way, Frank 
exhorts his adherents and followers to ‘study and watch’ women as mere objects 
of sexual desire: “They are universal. They are sheep. They are to be studied and 
watched. They have patterns […]. They are all the same. […] That is what you 
                                                          
59
 The original reads as follows: “[L]e manquant reste certes simplement absent pour 
tout un chacun, mais, pour qui le désire, son absence intuitive le donne encore, voire 
plus intensément; ce qui manque brille par son absence – celui-là, sans intuition, se 
donne d’autant plus.” (Marion, 2013: 507) 
60
 One might think of the same root of abandonné [abandoned] and adonné [gifted]. 
61
 The original reads as follows: “Plus j’aime à perte, plus j’aime tout court.” (Marion, 
2003: 117) 
62
 The original reads as follows: “Aimer surpasse l’être d’un excès […]. Aimer sans 
l’être [être aimé] – cela définit l’amour sans l’être.” (Ibid.: 118) 
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must do, which is punish them many times over.” (movie quote) This explicit 
objectification of the Other seems to be the absolute opposite of the erotic re-
duction.  
The erotic reduction, however, does come to the fore, namely in Frank’s re-
lation to his father. We may recall from the previous discussion that Marion 
defines love as being univocal, thereby encompassing a father-child relation as 
well. Being closely intertwined, givenness and love are certified by the same 
gesture of denegation. As Marion demonstrates convincingly in his ‘Reason of 
the Gift’, fatherhood is, from the outset, a gift reduced to givenness (see Marion, 
2005: 117). Earl as a father embodies the figure of a ‘bracketed giver’: he is the 
ever missing father (see ibid.: 119), since the father remains always essentially 
missing by withdrawing after the moment of procreation: “The father is also 
missing later because he leaves (must leave), and attracts the child’s attention by 
– in principle – being lacking to him.” (Ibid.)63 But it is mainly because Earl 
abandons the young Frank for the second time – leaving him to take care of his 
ill mother all by himself – that makes his absence absolute.  
As for Frank, he represents the ‘bracketed receiver’ of the gift, not only be-
cause a son can never render to his father the gift he gave to him, namely life, 
but, above all, because Frank chooses to hate his father. The father’s double 
abandonment corresponds to the son’s double denial. Nevertheless, as we al-
ready noted, being missed, lacked, or absent reinforces givenness ex negativo: 
“the giver would give all the better by disappearing (as unknown or deceased) 
from the givee’s view” (ibid.: 116).64 Similarly, hatred does not block but in-
stead facilitates entry into the erotic reduction, since it puts in play the same 
‘elsewhere’ that individualizes, summons, and obsesses me (see Marion, 2007: 
61). Moreover, in hatred the access to the Other is even more direct than in love, 
because it assigns to the hated one the status of a person [personne] (see ibid.: 
178), of somebody, but at the same time also of nobody, of someone disincar-
nated, someone who is no one, no body. It is the ambiguity of the French per-
sonne that is responsible for this paradox (see Marion, 2003: 235f.). In Marion’s 
metaphorical usage, the hated Other arrives to me in the figure of Janus, of “the 
one that I hate and who ought to love me, the one that I would like to love even 
                                                          
63
 The original reads as follows: “Le père manque aussi plus tard, parce qu’il part (doit 
partir) et se fait remarquer à l’enfant en ce qu’il lui fait défault et ce, par principe.” 
(Marion, 2004: 23) 
64
 The original reads as follows: “le donateur donnerait d’autant mieux qu’il disparaîtrait 
(inconnu, décédé) aux yeux de ce dernier” (ibid.: 20). 
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when he hates me” (ibid.: 60f.).65 The hated fulfills the same function as the 
beloved one: to assign me to myself, although, in the extreme, since “in hatred, 
the other, still sticks out and pierces through”; the Other “still imposes [him]self 
in the horizon of my phenomenality” (ibid.: 178),66 and, therefore, gives himself 
all the more radically.  
In the movie, both hate and love are constructed along the crossing gazes of 
father and son. This process can be better described with another of Marion’s 
recurring formulas, namely ‘what gives itself shows itself’. As we already 
know, givenness in Marion can but must not necessarily appear. However, if it 
does so then only indirectly by coming forward, by imposing itself as event, 
which means – however tautological it might sound – giving itself. Marion ar-
ticulates here the ambiguity of the word givenness [donation]: as a result of 
givenness (the given, the gift given, the datum) and as a process (giving, hap-
pening, arising, and eventually showing itself) (see Marion, 2001: 62). His met-
aphor for this ambivalence is “the fold of givenness” [le pli de la donation]. The 
process in which the given [la donnée] unfolds “its irreparable character”, i.e. 
givenness [donation], or, in which givenness “articulates the gift given […] 
along the progress of its advent” (ibid.: 64f.),67 is called “unfolding the fold of 
givenness” (ibid.: 70).68 
In Magnolia, givenness, which can be understood as hate/love and also as 
fatherhood, does unfold into the given: the father’s face. The father’s appearing 
to the son progresses indirectly and slowly, as Marion would call it, according to 
its anamorphosis: through numerous mediators Earl still manages to reach 
Frank. The son receives a call from his now remorseful father and comes to his 
death bed. Although this call is a quite real phone call, at the same time it clear-
ly achieves the phenomenological status of an appeal [appel] (see Marion, 2013: 
460f.) that articulates the Other’s manifestation. Following the logic of 
givenness, the call cannot be denied, for even as negation it is still a reply that 
summons me as a receiver (see Marion, 2001: 271). The final face-to-face con-
tact between Earl and Frank remains verbally incomplete. Earl, who is on the 
edge of life and death, can no longer speak and answer Frank’s swearing and 
                                                          
65
 The original reads as follows: “autrui m’apparaît sous la figure de Janus – celui que je 
hais et qui devrait m’aimer, celui que je voudrais aimer alors qu’il me hait” (Marion, 
2003: 101). 
66
 The original reads as follows: “dans la haine, autrui pointe et perce toujours […], il 
s’impose toujour dans l’horizon de ma phénoménalité” (ibid.: 275). 
67
 The original reads as follows: “son caractère irrémédiable”, and further: “La donation 
se dépliant articule le don donné […] sur son processus d’avènement […].” (Marion, 
2013: 108, 110) 
68
 The original reads as follows: “déplier le pli de la donation” (ibid.: 118). 
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reproaching for not calling before: “Why didn’t you call? I f*** hate you!” 
(movie quote) All that Earl can give, all that he can expose, is his mute face 
(Fig. 7), the icon to which no particular meaning can be assigned because it 
exceeds any meaning. This is a significant change for Frank who, as has been 
said before, thinks or rather pretends to think of the Other as a mere object for 
studying and manipulating with the help of a sum of ground rules he preaches. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Frank and Earl 
 
Saturated phenomena such as the icon (the face) and the event (the father’s 
death) arise from a reduced gift (fatherhood, love-hate); the lack thus unfolds 
into an excess. As for the agents of this ‘unfolding’, they receive their status as 
the gifted confirmed both by lack and by excess. By having accepted his father’s 
call and having arrived to him, Frank asserts both Earl and himself as the gifted, 
thereby confirming indirectly the gift of fatherhood. Furthermore, he witnesses 
Earl’s death, and a witness, as mentioned above, is another embodiment of the 
gifted. He sees the passage, the event, since death as a saturated phenomenon 
can only be phenomenalized in happening [se passant]. He becomes the one 
who assists his father’s death, which is the only act of love he could perform as 
a son, for “the child will render a peaceful death to his father, but will never 
give back (or render) him life” (Marion, 2005: 120).69  
Frank accedes to the Other’s face by experiencing it as event, and thus ac-
cedes to “the truth of the face”, or its final signification. The truth of the face 
consists not in any meaning, but in what happens to it – death, since love con-
sists in staying until the one you love dies:  
                                                          
69
 The original reads as follows: “l’enfant rendra la mort sereine à son père, mais jamais 
ne lui redonnera ou rendra une vie” (Marion, 2004: 24). 
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The truth of the face is therefore played in its story – not in what it says, but in 
what it does […]. To envisage a face requires less to see it than to wait for it, 
to wait for its accomplishment, the terminal act, the passage to effectivity. 
[…] That is why to love would mean to help the other person to the point of 
the final instant of his or her death. And to see the other finally, in truth, 
would mean, in the end, closing his or her eyes. (Marion, 2002a: 122f.)70 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In Marion’s phenomenological project, givenness is essentially conceived of in 
terms of a positively understood totality, to which all phenomena can be as-
cribed, including those which ‘are not’, that is to say, those whose beingness is 
in doubt. Just as Marion insists on the primacy of givenness over being in his 
principal study Étant donné, in his inquiry into the erotic, he asserts that love 
likewise precedes being. Marion thus attempts to develop his concept of the 
erotic without inscribing it into another phenomenological horizon. His main 
concern is not what or if love is, but various manifestations – by excess or by 
lack – that love may attain. As paradoxical as it might seem, the givenness of 
love unfolds most radically in its negation – this idea recurs systematically 
throughout Marion’s study.  
The juxtaposition of Marion’s erotic phenomenology with Paul Thomas 
Anderson’s movie Magnolia allows us to consider the latter from the standpoint 
of unity (the very totality of givenness and of the erotic), of wholeness, and of 
aesthetic closure. This perspective reestablishes the higher interconnectedness of 
the film’s elements, or its logic of contingency. The more negation Magnolia 
achieves through its exemplary narrative of separation, absence, lack, rejection, 
hatred, and death, the more givenness it attests and the more love it sustains. In 
its purest form, the erotic reduction becomes accomplished in a paradoxical 
experience of the Other’s (in-)visibility (as icon and call), the abandonment of 
reciprocity and, ultimately, at a loss – facing up to the Other’s death.  
 
 
 
                                                          
70
 The original reads as follows: “La vérité du visage se joue donc dans son histoire. Non 
dans ce qu’il dit, mais dans ce qu’il fait […]. Envisager un visage exige moins de le voir 
que de l’attendre. D’en attendre l’accomplissement, l’acte terminal, le passage à 
l’effectivité. […] C’est pourquoi aimer voudrait dire assister autrui jusqu’à l’instant 
terminal de sa mort. Et le voir enfin en vrai, cela reviendrait finalement à lui fermer les 
yeux.” (Marion, 2010: 154) 
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